

Party Campaign Strategies: Rallies, Canvassing and Handouts in an African Election*

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Abstract

Using post-election survey data from over 6,000 citizens, we document the campaign footprints of Ghana's two major political parties ahead of the country's 2012 elections. While researchers acknowledge resource disparities between opposition and ruling parties in developing democracies, our analysis shows these differences translate into concrete campaign outcomes. We theorize that the incumbent party will use its greater access to financial resources to mount a more national campaign, campaigning outside of stronghold constituencies. Additionally, because the ruling party can use transfers of resources *before* the election to shore up votes in core constituencies, it can dedicate campaign resources to other types of constituencies. The data confirm these trends. Further, in highlighting the importance of face-to-face mobilization tactics, we document the widespread use of political rallies and canvassing, which dominate the distribution of material handouts. Our results demonstrate how advantages of incumbency impact campaign decisions, with implications for governance and elections in young democracies.

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Multi-party elections are now routine in many developing countries, including many in Africa. However, our knowledge of political party campaign strategies in low-income democracies remains limited in several important ways. First, much of the literature focuses on strategies such as vote buying and clientelism,¹ electoral violence and voter intimidation,² and electoral fraud (e.g. Asunka et al., 2017; Collier and Vicente, 2012). Yet other strategies, such as campaign rallies and door-to-door canvassing, appear to be widespread in many low-income democracies in Africa and elsewhere (Conroy-Krutz, 2016; Horowitz, 2016). However, in many contexts we lack descriptive information about how widespread these other strategies are and evidence about how these strategies are strategically targeted during an election. Second, much research — including some of our own — focuses on specific campaign strategies in isolation. As a result, we lack a holistic picture of how parties allocate resources to different types of campaign strategies — their “portfolio” — and how these portfolios vary by party type (e.g., incumbent or challenger) and across local political contexts. How do parties in low-income democracies allocate resources to different types of strategies? How are these strategies targeted to different groups of voters? And how do campaign strategies vary between incumbents and opposition parties?

While answers to these questions are important in their own right, they also have significant implications for the quality of democracy and democratic consolidation. If, for example, parties rely predominantly on clientelism or voter intimidation, elections may fail to produce accountable government and citizens may become disillusioned with the democratic process. Of, if incumbents are disproportionately advantaged, the playing field may too uneven for elections to be considered democratic (Levitsky and Way, 2010). In addition, answers to these questions have important implications for our scholarly understanding of democratic elections in low-income democracies. If we focus our attention on only a subset of party campaign strategies, we will have an incomplete, and potentially biased, view of the democratic process.

We address these questions by studying the campaign strategies of Ghana’s two major political parties. We focus our investigation on three of the most prevalent campaign strategies in Ghana and

¹Researchers have studied vote buying and clientelism in many developing regions; the Middle East (Corstange, 2012), South and Central America (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005), South East Asia (Wang and Kurzman, 2007), and sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton, 2008; Nugent, 2007; Kramon, 2017; Wantchekon, 2003).

²See, for example, Asunka et al. (2017); Collier and Vicente (2014); Robinson and Torvik (2009); Straus and Taylor (2012).

elsewhere: campaign rallies (Szwarcberg, 2012a; Horowitz, 2016), canvassing voters in their homes (Nathan, 2016; Conroy-Krutz, 2016; Horowitz, 2016), and electoral clientelism (“electoral handouts” or vote buying) (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). We study the parties’ relative investments in these different strategies and how they allocate these strategies to different types of electoral districts (electorally competitive areas, core districts, and opposition districts).

Theoretically, we argue that incumbents and challengers are likely to pursue different campaign strategies. The argument is built upon three features of the institutional and electoral context in many developing democracies in Africa, and elsewhere. First, the incumbent party generally enjoys a substantial resource advantage compared to the opposition (Arriola, 2012; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Second, control over state resources is often concentrated in the executive branch, and presidents can use this discretion to target scarce public resources to favor certain constituencies *before* the election campaign even begins (Briggs, 2012; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014; Kramon and Posner, 2016). Third, parties engage in a significant amount of labor intensive, face-to-face campaigning.

These three conditions have several implications for campaign strategies. First, the incumbent should be able to pursue a more national campaign strategy than the challenger, expending more resources in electorally competitive and opposition strongholds. This is the case for two reasons. First, because incumbents enjoy a resource advantage, they are able to pay non-ideologically committed activists to work for the party. This gives them an advantage in electorally competitive areas and opposition strongholds, where the pool of ideologically committed activists is smaller than in their own core support districts. Second, the incumbent party can use its discretion over the allocation of state resources to shore up support in its core stronghold areas before the campaign period begins. This allows the party to campaign more aggressively in other parts of the country. Finally, resource advantages allow the incumbent to invest more heavily in more resource intensive strategies, such as the distribution of handouts.

We provide evidence for this argument with data from a post-election survey conducted in 60 electoral constituencies in Ghana immediately following the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Survey questions asked respondents about their experiences with rallies, door-to-door canvassing, and handouts. Importantly, the survey questions distinguish between activities undertaken by Ghana’s two major political parties, which allows us to study how incumbent and challenger strategies differ. To

our knowledge, our survey is, somewhat surprisingly, one of the first to make this distinction between parties. We sampled constituencies to produce variation in the degree of local electoral competition. Accordingly, our sample includes citizens in constituencies that we classify as incumbent strongholds, opposition strongholds, and as electorally competitive.³ We use this variation across constituencies to investigate parties' geographic allocation of resources.

Our main results are as follows. First, we document widespread door-to-door canvassing and rally attending in Ghana. Over 40 percent of citizens attend a rally, and about 30 percent report that a representative from a political party visited their home to discuss the election. Second, the incumbent party engages in higher levels of vote buying, a more resource intensive strategy. Third, the incumbent and challenger allocate resources differently across different types of electoral districts. The incumbent adopts a more national campaign strategy, canvassing and buying votes most intensely outside of its stronghold. The opposite is true for the challenger party, which canvasses the most where the party is already electorally dominant. Fourth, the incumbent party invests in a different portfolio of strategies in different local electoral contexts. Specifically, it organizes relatively more campaign rallies in its strongholds, while it engages in relatively more door-to-door canvassing in competitive districts and opposition strongholds. Consistent with our argument about the limited national reach of the opposition, however, the opposition party invests most heavily in all campaign strategies in its strongholds areas.

These findings results make at least three contributions. First, by examining multiple campaign strategies in the context of a single election, our paper is among the first to present a holistic picture of party campaign strategies on the continent. Consistent with Horowitz (2016), who studies campaign rallies and canvassing in Kenya, we document that door-to-door canvassing is widespread during elections. Although some door-to-door visits surely involve clientelistic exchanges (Nathan, 2016), the evidence we provide below suggests this tactic also involves efforts to persuade or mobilize voters on policy and programmatic grounds.⁴ This highlights that a more complete understanding of election campaigns in low-income democracies requires an analysis of both clientelistic and non-clientelistic forms of campaigning.

³We discuss the variables we use to classify constituencies in detail in Section 2.

⁴Data from the Afrobarometer, which we discuss below, provides evidence that these visits most commonly involve discussions about the party's policy positions and platform.

Second, our results deepen our understanding of the advantages of incumbency in Africa and other low-income democracies. While previous work has highlighted that opposition parties struggle for resources (Arriola, 2013; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009), our results document how these resource imbalances translate into differences in the types of campaigns that incumbents and challengers are able to conduct. Thus, while it is not surprising that there is an incumbency advantage in Ghana, our contribution is to show one channel through which this advantage manifests itself. In addition, our results may help to explain why opposition parties in Africa often struggle to generate electoral support outside of their strongholds (Wahman, 2015); opposition parties simply can not afford to campaign heavily in these areas.

Third, our results imply that parties do not adopt a universal “core” or “swing” voter targeting strategy (Gans Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Instead, we show that parties — and the incumbent in particular — invest more heavily in some types of strategies in their stronghold areas, where their core supporters reside, and more heavily in other types of strategies in competitive areas or opposition strongholds, where swing voters and opposition supporters reside. These findings complement and contribute to a growing literature which highlights that governments and political parties often adopt different strategies when targeting different types of electoral constituencies (Albertus, 2012; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estévez, 2007).

1 Incumbency and Political Party Campaign Strategies in Ghana

Ghana has held competitive multi-party elections every four years following a return to democratic rule in November 1992. Along with a growing number of African countries, there have been three successful democratic transitions of power, in 2000, 2008 and 2016. Two parties dominate electoral politics, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). We focus on Ghana’s December 2012 election during which the NDC was the incumbent party, and the NPP was the main challenger. The NDC won the election, securing both the presidency and the majority of parliamentary seats.

The president is elected in a single national constituency using a majoritarian run-off system while MPs are elected in single-member districts. The need for the president to secure an absolute majority to win office incentivizes political parties to seek votes from across the country. Accordingly, both

major parties have a national character, and draw support from “all geographic constituencies, encapsulating different groups, socio-economic backgrounds and perspectives” (Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, 2008, p.147). That said, each party has areas of historic electoral dominance that coincide with ethnic alliances (Fridy, 2007). While ex-President J. J. Rawlings popularly referred to the Volta region as the electoral “World Bank” of the NDC, the constituencies in the populous Ashanti region are stronghold areas for the NPP. The Volta and Ashanti regions are two of Ghana’s ten administrative regions. At the parliamentary level, voters elect Members of Parliament (MPs) using plurality rule in 275 single-member constituencies.

Rising levels of electoral competition have created an incentive for the ruling party to use public resource to finance the party’s campaign. The closeness of electoral contests is exemplified by Ghana’s 2008 presidential race which saw the NDC’s candidate (John Evans Atta-Mills) beat the opposition candidate with a razor-thin margin of 40,000 votes (out of an electorate of roughly 14 million). Lindberg (2003) argues that this increased competition has led to an explosion in campaign spending. He estimates that parliamentary candidates spent around \$40,000 on their campaigns in 2004, which increased to \$75,000 in 2008 (Lindberg, 2010). To put these figures in perspective, the annual salary of an MP was approximately \$24,000 (post-tax and deductions) in 2010 (Lindberg, 2010).

Citizens can join both parties and serve them in official roles at the local, regional and national levels. Each party has institutionalized grassroots members into the party structure through the establishment of polling station level positions.⁵ Party activists often compete in elections to win these local positions. Both parties also organize competitive local primaries to select presidential and parliamentary candidates, which gives party members a direct influence on the composition of national party elites (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). During the campaign period, which intensifies in the three months before the elections, the mass party network comes to life. Regional offices dispatch resources to polling stations where party mobilizers draw up local campaign plans.

⁵The NDC have party positions in each electoral ward, while the NPP have positions for each polling station.

1.1 Campaign Strategies

Political parties in Ghana adopt a number of campaign strategies, and we focus the three that are most prevalent. First, as in other countries in Africa (Horowitz, 2016) and elsewhere (Szwarcberg, 2012a), presidential and parliamentary candidates regularly hold campaign *rallies*. Rallies typically involve both the presidential candidate and the MPs from nearby constituencies. Ordinary voters, and local notables, including traditional chiefs attend rallies. Political parties often bus citizens into metropolitan areas for rallies, and provide food or drinks for those who make the journey. At rallies, voters are also given t-shirts, handheld fans and other party paraphernalia emblazoned with pictures of the party's flag bearer. During rallies, politicians take to the stage to discuss their campaign promises, and disparage the opposition. In terms of cost, rallies are no doubt expensive to organize; stages and PA systems need to be erected, sometimes large screens are also mounted. In addition, parties must pay activists to bring voters to the rally, and provide nourishment to those who attend. Sometimes parties also exchange money with citizens in return for their attendance. Parties weigh these costs against the benefits. One important benefit is the creation of a public perception that the party is popular; in this regard, the larger the rally the better. Second, rallies can be cost effective in that politicians' messages are able to reach a large number of voters – often thousands – in one day.

A second major campaign activity in Ghana is *door-to-door canvassing* (Nathan, 2016). Here, political party activists visit potential voters at their homes in an effort to mobilize them to turn out to vote — when targeting core supporters — or to persuade them to vote for their party — when targeting swing voters or supporters of the competing party. Nationally representative survey data collected by the Afrobarometer shed some light on what happens when political party activists canvass potential voters at their homes. The survey conducted in 2012 (Round 5) included the following country-specific question about party activists: *In your opinion, which three main activities would you say grassroots political party activists (or foot soldiers) primarily engage themselves in during election campaigns and elections?* This was an open-ended question with enumerators coding responses into pre-defined categories.

The data show that the most frequent first responses to this question were (1) “Explaining their party's plans, policies and programs during campaign” (22 percent), and (2) “Mobilizing people to sup-

port their party during elections” (12 percent). A smaller proportion of people said that the main activity of activists is to distribute gifts to voters (7 percent), and a very small proportion mention intimidation or violence (2 percent).⁶ The idea that party activists are informed about the policies of the party they represent is also documented in the handbooks that parties in Ghana provide to activists. For example, the NPP’s “Polling Station Manual” says that “It is deemed very necessary for Polling Station Executives [party activists] to up-date themselves on the policies and programmes of the NPP government so as to be able to proactively defend the Party at all times and at whichever level” (New Patriotic Party, 2006). Thus, while party activists do employ a range of techniques when canvassing voters door-to-door, it seems that a large component of these interactions involves mobilizing electoral support through a discussion of plans and policies rather than vote buying or intimidation.

During the election that we study, one of the major policies that both parties discussed was the challenger’s commitment to make senior high school (SHS) free (Brierley and Ofori, 2014).⁷ NPP billboards displayed the slogan “Free SHS Now! Not in 20 years. Your vote can make it happen.” Party activists have the task of convincing voters that the party’s proposed policies will have a positive impact on their lives. They also remind voters of the party’s track record over the years of democratic rule. For example, NDC activists are often eager to remind voters that their party was responsible for the electrification of the North of the country (Briggs, 2012), while NPP mobilizers are keen to remind voters, especially women, that they introduced the national health insurance scheme, which significantly reduced the cost of maternity care.

The distribution of money and gifts is also common during campaigns (Lindberg, 2003; Nugent, 2007). Many voters expect to receive gifts from candidates (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2016) and put pressure on candidates to distribute private benefits during the campaign (Lindberg, 2013). According to Afrobarometer survey data, about 12 percent of Ghanaians were offered money or a gift during the 2004 elections, and about 7 percent were offered money or a gift during the 2012 elections. Much vote buying in Ghana, and elsewhere in Africa, occurs in public spaces such as campaign rallies

⁶These figures correspond to respondents’ first answer. The percentages for second and third responses are as follows: discussing policies (9 percent), mobilizing support (14 percent), giving gifts (6 percent), intimidating voters on election day (2 percent), and, discussing policies (7 percent), mobilizing support (12 percent), giving gifts (6 percent), intimidating on election day (2 percent), respectively.

⁷Primary and junior high school (JHS) are already free in Ghana.

(Kramon, 2016), and the data referenced suggests that some vote buying also occurs when activists canvass voters door-to-door.

1.2 Incumbency Advantage and Campaign Strategies

How and where do parties invest in these different campaign strategies? Our argument is that incumbency shapes the answer to this question. We emphasize two incumbency advantages that we expect will shape incumbent versus opposition campaign strategies.

First, opposition parties are at a significant resource disadvantage because they lack access to state resources. In Ghana, the incumbent party is in a particularly strong position because the constitution requires that the president appoints the political head of each local government.⁸ This provision ensures that both the national and local bureaucracy, traditional sources of party finance, are in the hands of the ruling party. In contrast, opposition parties have little to offer private firms aside from prospective promises. Accordingly, the opposition struggles to obtain financial capital (Arriola, 2012, 2013).

Second, the incumbent is advantaged because it can direct public resources to fulfill its political goals *before* the election campaign even begins. There is evidence that presidents in some African countries channel public goods and resources to areas where their ethnic and partisan supporters live in high concentrations (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014). Briggs (2012) finds evidence of such targeting in Ghana, showing that incumbents have disproportionately delivered electrification to their stronghold areas.

These advantages shape campaign strategies in two important ways. First, the incumbent's resource advantage should allow it to invest in more *resource intensive* campaign strategies. In particular, the incumbent should be better able to distribute private benefits to voters ahead of elections. Indeed there is some evidence that the incumbent party in Ghana is able to engage in more vote buying (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2016).

Second, we expect that these advantages allow the incumbent to pursue a more *national* campaign strategy. This is largely because each of the main campaign strategies described above is labor intensive. As a result, each party must deploy a vast network of political party activists — known locally in Ghana

⁸Article 243 of Ghana's 1992 constitution. The head of a local government is called the District Chief Executive.

as “foot soldiers” — to engage in campaign-related work. As in other contexts, political party activists play a central role in mobilizing voters to attend campaign rallies (Szwarcberg, 2012*a,b*), canvassing potential voters door-to-door (Horowitz, 2016), and engaging in vote buying and gift giving (Kramon, 2016; Lindberg, 2003; Stokes et al., 2013).

Party activists are motivated to work on campaigns for two reasons. First, some are motivated by a partisan attachment to their preferred party. This is especially the case in each party’s stronghold areas. However, many others work for political parties in return for private benefits (Bob-Milliar, 2012), or because of the expectation that they will receive private benefits should their party win office (Driscoll, 2017). These benefits take the form of state employment, the payment of school fees and health care bills, and contributions to weddings and funerals.

Given their resource advantage, incumbent parties can more easily attract the type of activists who are motivated by private benefits. Because they are richer, incumbent parties can offer upfront benefits to these activists and, because they are already in office, their promises of post-election benefits may appear more credible (Wantchekon, 2003). Thus, in addition to having more money to spend on campaigns, the incumbent has a comparative advantage in the recruitment of non-ideologically committed activists.

This advantage is important because each party’s pool of ideologically committed activists is likely to be concentrated in its stronghold areas (Fridy, 2007). Thus, while both parties should be able to campaign intensely in their own strongholds, the opposition is at a disadvantage with respect to its ability to pay activists to work in other parts of the country. By contrast, the incumbent can use its resource advantage to pay activists to campaign outside of its areas of core support. This implies that the incumbent will be able to invest more effort in campaigning in competitive and opposition electoral districts, while the challenger may be confined to its strongholds.

A second reason that the incumbent should be able to pursue a more national campaign strategy is that the incumbent can strategically allocate state resources to fulfilling its electoral goals well in advance of the electoral period. Discretion over the state allows the incumbent to solidify electoral support in stronghold areas through targeted redistribution of state resources.⁹ We expect that this frees up the incumbent to campaign more intensely in competitive and opposition-stronghold areas of the country

⁹It also allows the incumbent to deter insurgencies from within the party (Cox, 2010); that is, to prevent elites from defecting from the party and running against it as independents.

during the campaign.

In summary, political parties in low-income democracies such as Ghana pursue a range of campaign strategies. These strategies vary in how costly they are, while all strategies are somewhat labor intensive. Because incumbents enjoy substantial resource advantages and the executive enjoys significant discretion in the allocation of state resources before the campaign period begins, we argue that incumbent and challenger campaign strategies will differ in two important ways. First, incumbents and challengers will invest in a different mix, or portfolio, of campaign strategies, with the incumbent being able to invest more heavily in more resource intensive strategies such as vote buying. Second, because the incumbent can use its resource advantage to purchase the labor of non-ideologically committed activists and use its discretion over the allocation of state resources to shore up support in its stronghold areas before the campaign period begins, the incumbent should be able to pursue a more national campaign strategy.

2 Data and measurement

2.1 Post-election survey of voters

To investigate party campaign strategies, we conducted a large-scale citizen survey during the two days that followed Ghana's 2012 general elections. Citizens from four of Ghana's ten regions — Ashanti, Central, Volta, and Western — were included in our sample.¹⁰ The timing of the survey immediately after the election facilitates reliable reporting on campaign activities. We selected the study regions because of the variation they offer in their levels of electoral competition. As we discuss above, the Ashanti and Volta regions are not electorally competitive. In contrast, the Central and Western regions are home to some of Ghana's most competitive constituencies, with these districts containing many voters who are “up for grabs” in each election (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013). We leverage this variation across constituencies to investigate party campaign strategies across different electoral environments.

To select respondents, we first drew a random sample of polling stations within the four regions.¹¹ Survey enumerators then found a central location near to the polling station and used a random-walk

¹⁰According to the last census, about half of Ghana's population lives in these regions.

¹¹We sampled these polling stations for a concurrent project on election observers where the polling station was our unit of analysis. In total, just over 2,000 polling stations were in our original sample. Due to logistical challenges, we were unable to collect survey data from voters living close to each of these polling stations. In our survey sample, we have responses from citizens from 1,571 polling stations, contained within 58 constituencies in our four regions.

technique to select households.¹² To select respondents, enumerators created a list of all adults of voting age who resided in the household. They then selected one individual at random, alternating between males and females. We conducted surveys with nearly 6,000 citizens, recruiting roughly 300 survey enumerators.¹³ The surveys were conducted in English, as well as Akan and Ewe, the two major local languages in the regions where we conducted the study.¹⁴

2.2 Dependent variables

To analyze different modes of campaigning, we asked respondents a battery of questions on voters' contact with parties prior to the election. To analyze variation in strategies between different types of parties, we asked these questions separately for both of the two major parties. Distinguishing between parties makes our data unusually rich and builds on prior surveys that only asks voters whether parties contacted or gave them gifts, without asking them *which* parties (Stokes, 2005; Bratton, 2008). Using these data, we construct six dependent variables.

To document the prevalence of rallies we asked voters, *Have you seen the candidate for MP of this constituency from the following parties at a rally or any other event during the current elections?* We code responses separately for each party to construct two dummy variables, with positive responses taking the value of one. Our second two outcomes measure rates of canvassing. We use responses to the following question: *Did any political party agents come to your place of residence to encourage you to vote for their party?* Again, the outcomes are dummy variables that take the value of one if the party canvassed the respondent and zero otherwise.

Our final set of outcome variables assess the frequency of handouts. We use responses to the following question: *Did you witness any of these parties distributing items such as money, food, fertilizer, or cell phones to voters in your area during the election?* Although we desire to know which individuals

¹²The Afrobarometer, Africa's leading public opinion organization, use the random walk technique to select respondents, as do many other survey researchers on the continent. We provided enumerators with the same instructions that the Afrobarometer provides to its enumerators. Ideally, we would have selected respondents directly from the official voter registration list. As Ghana's Electoral Commission was unwilling to release this information to us prior to the elections, we sampled households.

¹³These enumerators were recruited as part of a larger project that analyzed the impact on election observers on election-day fraud and violence. We present the results of this project in Asunka et al. (2017). We trained the enumerators at multiple training sessions held in each of the four regions in our sample.

¹⁴English is Ghana's national language.

received gifts from parties, we framed this question with reference to the respondent's local area. We did this to guard against response bias. Previous research shows that vote buying is a sensitive topic and that citizens under-report vote buying when asked directly if they received gifts (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012). To minimize bias, we therefore follow previous researchers and ask voters whether they observe vote buying in their area (e.g. Stokes, 2005).¹⁵

2.3 Classification of constituency types

To investigate whether incumbent and opposition parties campaign differently across electoral environments, we classify constituencies into three categories. We code a constituency as being an *incumbent stronghold* when the NDC received over 65 percent of the votes in the prior (2008) election. All constituencies where the incumbent party received less than 35 percent of the vote we code as a *opposition stronghold*.¹⁶ *Competitive* constituencies are those where the NDC received between 35 and 65 percent of the votes in the prior election.

2.4 Control Variables

In the regression analyses we present below, we also control for a range of constituency and individual-level predictors. Research shows that when parties distribute campaign gifts they tend to target poorer voters (Bratton, 2008; Jensen and Justesen, 2014). We create a poverty index as a composite indicator of respondents' approximate wealth. To construct this variable we sum responses to a set of questions that asked citizens how often they go without: cash income; food; medicine and electricity. Political parties may also target younger voters in an attempt to generate future party support. We also control for age and gender.

Beyond individual demographic factors, research on turnout in Africa shows that citizens who live in rural areas are more likely to vote than their urban counterparts (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010). This could imply that parties invest campaign resources in rural areas perhaps because social networks are denser compared to in towns and cities. We control for whether citizens live in predominantly rural

¹⁵We also asked respondents whether they personally received gifts. Because the survey was conducted in such close proximity to the election, respondents perceived this question as being highly sensitive. As a result, there were extremely high non-response rates on this item, which make it impossible to use in the analysis.

¹⁶Given the two party system, this is roughly equivalent to the NPP receiving 65 percent or more of the vote.

constituencies using data from Ghana’s 2010 census. We also use the census data to control for the share of houses with electricity, which we use as a proxy for how penetrable the constituency is. Finally, we control for overall constituency level wealth using the share of houses made of natural materials.

3 Results

3.1 How do parties campaign?

We first present results that investigate different modes of campaigning. Figure 1 disaggregates responses for each of the two major parties and presents mean levels of rally attendance, canvassing and the distribution of handouts. First, we consider rallies. The results show that over 45 percent of respondents in the sample report seeing politicians from the ruling party at a rally or other public event. The figures are similar for opposition party candidates. Interestingly, a large number of voters (35 percent) report attending public events organized by MP candidates from *both* of the two major parties. Overall, these results demonstrate that politicians in Ghana frequently organize rallies and that politicians interact with a large number of voters using this mode of campaigning.

Our results corroborate research from other African countries that also show that a significant share of the population interacts with parties at rallies. In Tanzania close to three quarters of the population attended a rally during the 2015 election campaign (Paget, 2017). In Uganda, over 60 percent of the population attend at least one party rally (Conroy-Krutz, 2016). Finally, in Kenya, Horowitz (2016) finds that President Kibaki held at least one rally in every two constituencies in the country in 2007.¹⁷ In general, our findings can be compared to a developed democracy, such as the United States, where roughly 10 percent of the population attend rallies.¹⁸

We note that our results are higher than those reported by the Afrobarometer, which shows that roughly 33 percent of Ghanaians attended a rally during the 2012 election (see Appendix (Section A)). Our results are likely to be slightly different for two reasons. First, the Afrobarometer survey was conducted two years after the campaign and respondents may have forgotten if they attended a rally. In comparison, our survey was conducted in the two days after the election, which should help with an

¹⁷Horowitz (2016) reports that the mean number of rallies for Kibaki per constituency was .57 (footnote 8).


¹⁸Civic Engagement in the Digital Age, Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/04/25/civic-engagement-in-the-digital-age/>, accessed on 29 October, 2017.

accurate recall of events. Second, our question was phrased to also include “meetings” held by the parliamentary candidate. Thus our estimate likely also includes attendance at smaller events that were organized by the party and by individual politicians.

With respect to canvassing, our data show that both the incumbent and opposition party visit about one in every three citizens at home. Again, many voters (23 percent) interact with party activists from both of the two major parties. While we recognize that parties in Ghana are some of the most well organized on the continent, these high rates of canvassing do not appear to be unique to the country. For example, in Uganda and Kenya, 60 percent and 40 percent of the population, respectively, report being visited by party agents in their homes (Conroy-Krutz, 2016; Horowitz, 2016).

Finally, we report the mean levels of handouts that parties distributed during the campaign. The data show that the incumbent party have a clear advantage in harnessing resources to distribute gifts to voters. Overall, about 13 percent of respondents indicate that the incumbent party distribute handouts to people in their community, compared to 8 percent for the opposition party. This difference is equivalent to a 62 percent increase in gifts distributed by the incumbent relative to the opposition. The difference that we find between the incumbent and opposition party is consistent with our argument that differential access to financial resources shapes how parties mobilize support. It is also clear that the prevalence of handouts is significantly lower than rates of either canvassing or rallies.


Figure 1: Incumbent and opposition party campaign strategies



3.2 Where do parties campaign?

Figure 2 disaggregates the results between the three different types of constituencies – stronghold constituencies of the incumbent, competitive constituencies, and stronghold constituencies of the opposition party. While both parties have similar rates of canvassing and appear to hold a similar number of rallies, they pursue quite different strategies in terms of *where* they campaign. We theorize that the incumbent has the advantage of being able to pay party activists who live outside of the party’s stronghold. In support of this argument, we find that the incumbent engages in much higher levels of canvassing outside of the party’s stronghold compared to the challenger.

Figure 2: Incumbent and opposition campaign strategies by constituency type



Notes: The middle category indicates competitive constituencies. Incumbent strongholds are constituencies where the incumbent party (NDC) received over 65 percent of the vote in the prior election. Opposition strongholds are constituencies where the incumbent party received less than 35 percent of the vote in the prior election.

The left plot in Figure 2 displays patterns of campaigning for the incumbent party. The incumbent canvasses 36 percent of citizens in opposition strongholds and roughly 33 percent in competitive constituencies (the middle category), compared to 23 percent in their stronghold areas (the solid line).

The plot on the right displays canvassing rates for the challenger. In contrast to the incumbent party, the opposition canvasses the most voters in the party's own stronghold constituencies – in these constituencies they canvass about 40 percent of citizens. These figures drop dramatically in other types of constituencies. In competitive constituencies, the opposition party canvasses about 30 percent of the citizens. Finally, in incumbent strongholds they canvass only 17 percent of the population. We discuss these results further below.

While the ruling party invests their resources to canvass voters outside of their stronghold constituencies, they continue to hold the highest number of rallies in constituencies that are home to their core supporters (the dashed line). In stronghold constituencies, over half of respondents report attending an NDC rally. The opposition party also reach the highest share of voters at rallies in their stronghold constituencies. These results are likely to be explained by the behavior of incumbent Members of Parliament. Incumbent parliamentarians are likely to organize rallies in their home constituencies. Accordingly, we see the NDC holding the most rallies in constituencies where they are electorally dominant, and similarly for the NPP.

Finally, Figure 2 displays rates of exchange-based campaigning (the dotted line). The plot on the left displays levels of handouts for the ruling party. In opposition strongholds and competitive constituencies, 14 percent of respondent report that the incumbent party distribute gifts in their local communities. In their strongholds the incumbent distributes gifts to fewer citizens – roughly 10 percent of respondents report that gifts are distributed. The plot on the right shows levels of handouts for the opposition party. The results show that in every type of constituency the opposition distribute fewer gifts than the incumbent. In their strongholds and in competitive constituencies, the opposition party distributes gifts to 9 percent of citizens. In the incumbent party's stronghold only about 7 percent of citizens receive gifts from the opposition.

Disaggregating the results across different types of constituencies shows that there is a divergence between the ruling and opposition parties in terms of where they canvass voters. Specifically, the ruling party canvasses the most voters in constituencies that are home to large numbers of opposition voters. These are the same constituencies as the ones where the opposition party canvass in the most. We theorize that the incumbent employs such a strategy for two reasons. First, the ruling party has the

material strength to employ party activists outside of their stronghold constituencies, something that the opposition struggles to do. Second, the ruling party can shore up the votes of citizens in their home regions with material resources before the election campaign.

3.3 Regression analysis

Results from regressions analyses, which allow us to control for individual and constituency level factors that might shape party campaign strategies, are consistent with the descriptive patterns described above. The results in Tables 1 and 2 are from a logistic regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent was canvassed or attended a rally held by the party in question. The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 shows that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between incumbent party vote share and the probability of a respondent saying that they were canvassed by the incumbent party. The results in column 1 control for constituency-level characteristics that may influence rates of mobilization. In column 2, we add controls for a host of individual-level factors.¹⁹ The negative relationship remains unchanged.

Figure 3 displays the marginal effect of changes in prior NDC vote share in a constituency on the probability of a respondent being canvassed (left plot). The rug at the bottom of the plot displays the distribution of the independent variable of focus. Overall, there is a clear and substantively significant decrease in the probability of a voter being canvassed by the ruling party as the vote share of the incumbent party increases. In constituencies where the incumbent party got less than 20 percent of the vote in 2008 the probability of a citizen being canvassed before the 2012 election is over 0.4, and this drops roughly 50 percent in constituencies where over 80 percent of the population voted for the incumbent in the prior election. In short, the incumbent party canvassed the most in opposition stronghold constituencies.

¹⁹We discuss the control variables in Section 2.4.

Table 1: Logistic regressions predicting incumbent party campaign contact

	Incumbent canvass		Incumbent rally	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inc. vote share (08)	-0.158*** (0.046)	-0.226*** (0.053)	0.081 (0.051)	0.115** (0.059)
NDC voter		0.067*** (0.018)		0.042** (0.019)
Education		0.017* (0.010)		0.031*** (0.010)
Female		0.005 (0.012)		-0.041*** (0.014)
Poverty index		0.008* (0.004)		0.017*** (0.005)
Constant	0.281*** (0.101)	0.188* (0.113)	0.597*** (0.108)	0.514*** (0.119)
Constituency controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	5,376	3,915	5,355	3,899
<i>R</i> ²	0.014	0.023	0.011	0.023
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.013	0.021	0.010	0.021
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 5371)	0.462 (df = 3906)	0.496 (df = 5350)	0.495 (df = 3890)
F Statistic	18.722*** (df = 4; 5371)	11.580*** (df = 8; 3906)	15.014*** (df = 4; 5350)	11.312*** (df = 8; 3890)

Notes: Constituency controls are: degree of urbanization, share of houses with electricity, and share of houses made of natural materials (earth or wood). Clustered standard errors (polling station level) are in parentheses.

Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 present the same analyzes where rally attendance is the dependent variable. In contrast to the first two columns, the results display a positive relationship between incumbent party vote share and rally attendance. After controlling for individual-level characteristics this relationship is statistically significant at conventional levels (column 4). Figure 3 displays the marginal effect of changes in NDC vote share in a constituency on the probability of a respondent seeing an incumbent party MP at a rally (right plot). Again, the relationship is substantively significant. The probability of seeing a candidate at a rally increases by about 10 percentage points moving from constituencies where only 20 percent of the electorate support the incumbent party to constituencies where over 80 percent voted for the incumbent in the prior election.


It is also worthwhile to investigate which of the individual-level variables correlate with party campaign contact. The results in Table 1 suggest that the incumbent were more likely to canvass their core supporters. This is shown by the positive coefficient on the variable *NDC voter*.²⁰ Core supporters are also more likely to report attending a rally held by the incumbent party. Female respondents are no more likely to be canvassed compared to males, but do appear *less* likely to attend rallies. Additionally, individual poverty levels are positively correlated with both being canvassed and attending a rally.

Table 2 displays the results for the opposition party. Again, columns 1 and 3 control for constituency-level factors, while columns 2 and 4 add individual-level controls. Across all of the columns there is a strong and negative relationship between incumbent party vote share and the probability of a respondent being canvassed (columns 1 and 2) or seeing an MP candidate at a rally (columns 3 and 4). Figure 4 displays the marginal effect of incumbent party vote share on rates of canvassing (left) and rallies (right). The predicted probabilities demonstrate a large decrease in the propensity of the opposition party to contact voters in areas that are strongholds of the incumbent. In short, the opposition are much more likely to engage in campaign activities in their strongholds than outside of their strongholds. Overall, the regression results complement the descriptive data we display in Figure 2, showing that these results are unlikely to be explained by alternative constituency or individual level predictors.

Considering the individual variables that predict opposition canvass rates, we find that the opposition party canvassed their non-core supporters. This result is likely explained by the fact that the in-

²⁰NDC voter is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the respondent said that they voted for both the NDC presidential and parliamentary candidate in the prior (2008) election.

Figure 3: Incumbent party campaign strategy – canvassing versus rallies



cumbent were canvassing in high rates in the opposition party stronghold. This coefficient suggests that the opposition party retaliated by also canvassing the incumbent’s voters who resided in their stronghold constituencies. However, the negative coefficient on the variable *NDC voter* in column 2 suggests that NDC voters were less likely to attend rallies held by NPP candidates, as might be expected. Finally, as above, females appear less likely to attend rallies, and individual poverty rates are positively associated with both types of campaign contact.

In the Appendix (Section A) we use data from the Afrobarometer (AB) to investigate whether our results are robust to this alternative data set. We use data from Round 6 of the survey.²¹ While the AB survey did not include questions about house-to-house canvassing, it did ask about rally attendance. It is important to note that the AB survey did not ask about rally attendance for each party separately, and thus we are not able to fully replicate our analysis. However, the patterns we find using this alternative data source are broadly consistent with our findings. Disaggregating the AB data by region, we find that in constituencies that are strongholds of the opposition (NPP) party, incumbent party supporters are less likely to report attending a rally. Our data suggest that this is because the incumbent party held fewer

²¹This survey round was conducted in Ghana in 2014 and asked about rally attendance during the 2012 election – the election that we study in this paper.

rallies in these constituencies. Similarly, opposition supporters are less likely to report attending a rally in strongholds of the incumbent.²² Again, our data suggest that this is because the incumbent held fewer rallies in incumbent strongholds. The Afrobarometer data also corroborate our findings that females are less likely to attend rallies, and continue to show a positive association between individual poverty levels and rally attendance. This finding may be explained by poorer citizens having an incentive to attend rallies to obtain private benefits or handouts from parties.

Finally, an alternative approach to analyzing our survey data, is to analyze the responses at the level of the polling station as opposed to at the level of the individual. In such an analysis, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when *any* of the respondents from the station report attending in a rally, being canvassed, or seeing handouts being distributed. Our results remain identical if we adopt this approach. We present these results in the Appendix (Section B).

²²Note that this result is not statistically significant, although this is likely because of the small sample size, with only 206 respondents in the Volta region in the AB sample.


Table 2: Logistic regressions predicting opposition party campaign contact

	Opposition canvass		Opposition rally	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inc. vote share (08)	-0.320*** (0.044)	-0.335*** (0.052)	-0.334*** (0.048)	-0.243*** (0.055)
NDC voter		0.032* (0.017)		-0.037** (0.019)
Education		0.021** (0.010)		0.036*** (0.010)
Female		-0.012 (0.012)		-0.035*** (0.013)
Poverty index		0.005 (0.004)		0.010** (0.005)
Constant	0.385*** (0.095)	0.388*** (0.108)	0.615*** (0.100)	0.568*** (0.113)
Constituency controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls		Yes		Yes
<i>N</i>	5,697	4,102	5,667	4,078
<i>R</i> ²	0.041	0.044	0.020	0.021
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.041	0.042	0.019	0.019
Residual Std. Error	0.453 (df = 5692)	0.455 (df = 4093)	0.493 (df = 5662)	0.494 (df = 4069)
F Statistic	61.539*** (df = 4; 5692)	23.309*** (df = 8; 4093)	29.009*** (df = 4; 5662)	11.018*** (df = 8; 4069)

Notes:

Constituency controls are: degree of urbanization, share of houses with electricity, and share of houses made of natural materials (earth or wood). Individual controls are: education, gender, poverty index, and NDC voter in 2008. Clustered standard errors (polling station level) are in parentheses.

Figure 4: Opposition party campaign strategy – canvassing versus rallies



4 Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, we investigate party campaign strategies in Ghana. We seek to answer two questions: how do parties interact with voters during campaigns? In what type of districts do they invest their resources? To answer these questions, we use unique survey data that asked Ghanaian citizens detailed questions on which political parties contacted them during the country’s 2012 election campaign, and by what method. One important nuance to our data is that we ask these questions with separate responses for the incumbent and the major opposition party. This allows us to investigate campaign strategies across different types of parties. Finally, we sampled large numbers of citizens from a range of electoral environments — the strongholds of the incumbent, the stronghold of the challenger, as well as competitive constituencies — to analyze where parties campaign.

Our analysis produces an important descriptive finding: door-to-door canvassing is extremely widespread in Ghana. About 30 percent of our sample of Ghanaians reports that at least one of the two major political parties visited them at their home in an attempt to win their vote. A significant number of voters are targeted by both parties. Importantly, our data also suggests that door-to-door canvassing is substantially more prevalent than handouts. With respect to the distribution of handouts, we find that

the incumbent party distributes more gifts than the challenger in all constituency types. Thus, while the literature on African politics has typically emphasized the importance of exchange-based or otherwise manipulative campaign strategies — intimidation, election-rigging, and so on — our results suggest that parties also generate support by discussing their policies and programs with citizens. The opposition is also a lot less likely to distribute gifts than the incumbent.

Second, considering where parties campaign, our analysis shows that the incumbent engages in substantially more campaigning outside of areas where they are traditionally strong, while the opposition is confined to areas where they are already electorally strong and in competitive constituencies. These results, we argue, are driven by differential access to campaign resources. Facing a tighter budget constraint, the opposition is more reliant on party activists to generate support. This reliance, leads the opposition to focus their campaign efforts on their stronghold where there is a ready supply of party activists who are willing to canvass voters.

The incumbent also has the advantage of being able to direct state resources to core supporters to shore up the support of voters in its stronghold areas — and to prevent elite defections from the party — prior to and perhaps even during the campaign. This allows the incumbent to focus canvassing efforts in opposition and competitive constituencies. The challenger, on the other hand, does not have discretionary control over public resources and must invest resources mobilizing its core supporter base during the campaign.

While our theory highlights that the differences between the incumbent and challenger are critical, a limitation of our empirical approach is that we only focus on a single election. This makes it difficult for us to rule out that the differences in party strategies that we document are due to the NDC's status as incumbent, rather than other differences between the NDC and NPP in Ghana. Qualitative evidence, however, supports the idea that our results are driven by differences in party types. During the 2008 campaign, when the NPP were the incumbent party, there is evidence that they allocated significant resources to opposition strongholds regions, such as the Volta region. As Jockers, Kohnert and Nugent (2010) write: "The NPP exploited the advantage of incumbency in the Volta Region. For example, apart from the usual distribution of large numbers of T-shirts, they provided school books in the villages, traditional presents to the chiefs and... also cash as an incentive to vote for the right candidate" (p. 108).

Thus while the NDC, as incumbents in 2012, campaigned heavily in the Ashanti region, the NPP as incumbents in 2008 campaigned heavily in the Volta region.

Our finding that the incumbent is able to campaign outside their strongholds is also consistent with prior work that observes the difficulty opposition parties have in expanding their electoral support network beyond their home regions (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Wahman, 2015). The structure of many party systems in Africa, with the incumbent party dominating electoral politics, also displays the relative strength of parties in office (van de Walle, 2003; Lindberg, 2007). We acknowledge that a more conclusive analysis of how incumbency shapes a party's campaign strategy would track the strategies of the same political parties over multiple elections as they alternate between being incumbents and challengers. At present, we are unaware of data from Ghana, or elsewhere in Africa, that would permit such an analysis.

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Online Appendix


A Comparison with Afrobarometer data

Round 6 of the Ghana Afrobarometer survey included the following question:

- Thinking about the last national election in 2012, did you: attend a campaign rally?

The results show that 31 percent of respondents (N=2,400) report attending a rally during the 2012 election. Figure A.1 displays the mean share of rally attendance across each of Ghana's ten regions. These descriptive results should be interpreted with some caution as the Afrobarometer survey is not representative at the regional level. Also note that unlike our survey data, the Afrobarometer survey does not differentiate between parties when asking this question.

Figure A.1: Rally attendance by region (Afrobarometer Round 6)



In Table A.1 we regress rally attendance on a similar set of individual-level variables that we include in the analyses we present. In column 1, we show the results for the full sample. In columns 2-4, we disaggregate according to the four regions from which we obtained survey data. The results from the Afrobarometer corroborate the findings from our study. First, the results show that females are less likely to attend rallies. Second, respondents with higher levels of poverty are more likely to attend rallies. Like

our data, the Afrobarometer results also suggest a positive correlation between levels of education and rally attendance. In this analysis we also include a variable that indicates whether the respondent is close to either the NDC or NPP. In the regression analysis, the baseline category is respondents who *do not* feel close to a party.

The results show that in the full sample, people who feel close to either the NPP or NDC are more likely to attend rallies. The results in Column 2 show that in the Ashanti and Eastern regions (strongholds of the NPP), NPP supporters are more likely to attend rallies. The results that we present above suggest that this is because the NPP held more rallies in these constituencies. Similarly, the results in Column 3 show that in the Volta region NDC supporters are more likely to attend rallies, while there is a negative coefficient for NPP supporters. Again, our results help to understand the findings from the Afrobarometer, because we show that the NDC held more rallies in NDC strongholds compared to the NPP.

Table A.1: Logistic regression predicting rally attendance in the full sample and disaggregated by regions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Attend Rally			
	(1) Full sample	(2) Ashanti and Eastern	(3) Volta	(4) Central
Female	-0.505*** (0.094)	-0.751*** (0.177)	-0.589* (0.324)	-0.270 (0.351)
Poverty index	0.065*** (0.018)	0.035 (0.036)	0.139 (0.092)	0.007 (0.067)
Education	0.045* (0.024)	0.137** (0.055)	0.306*** (0.097)	-0.015 (0.100)
Close to NDC	0.690*** (0.120)	0.426 (0.346)	0.482 (0.363)	1.489*** (0.433)
Close to NPP	0.695*** (0.106)	1.014*** (0.186)	-0.274 (0.526)	0.681* (0.377)
Urban (enumeration unit)	-0.295*** (0.097)	0.070 (0.182)	-0.546 (0.345)	-0.351 (0.333)
Constant	-1.153*** (0.146)	-1.730*** (0.306)	-1.789*** (0.552)	-1.167** (0.570)
Observations	2,358	714	206	205
Log Likelihood	-1,400.584	-405.401	-121.135	-114.946
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,815.167	824.803	256.269	243.892

Notes: The baseline category is respondents who say they do not feel close to a party, we compare these respondents to those who say they feel close to the NDC and NPP. Constituencies in Ashanti and Eastern regions are strongholds of the NPP (who were the opposition party in our analysis). Constituencies in Volta region are strongholds of the NDC (who were the incumbent party in our analysis). The Central region is a competitive region. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B Replication of results with data aggregated at the polling station level

In the follow analyses the dependent variable take a value of 1 when *any* respondent at the polling station was (i) canvassed by the party in question (ii) observed/attended a rally (iii) saw gifts being distributed in their local area. Our main results are robust to this alternative model specification. Specifically, we continue to find that the incumbent party were more likely to canvass voters in constituencies where they had a low vote share in the prior election, while they continue to rally the the most in their stronghold constituencies. Again, we find that the opposition party are more likely to both rally or canvass support in their stronghold constituencies. We continue to find that vote share in the prior election is not predictive of where either party distribute campaign gifts.

Table B.1 displays the regression results. Figure B.1 and B.2 display the marginal effects (with other constituency level variables held constant at the mean).


Table B.1: Logit regressions: Predicting any campaign activity at the polling station

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Canvass (Inc.)	Rally (Inc.)	Gift (Inc.)	Canvass (Opp.)	Rally (Opp.)	Gift (Opp.)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
NDC Vote Sh. (2008)	−0.992*** (0.143)	0.398*** (0.153)	−0.098 (0.160)	−1.723*** (0.140)	−1.370*** (0.145)	0.099 (0.174)
Electricity	−1.255*** (0.268)	−2.156*** (0.297)	−0.293 (0.296)	−1.201*** (0.254)	−1.187*** (0.271)	0.949*** (0.327)
Urban	1.704*** (0.200)	0.516** (0.208)	2.024*** (0.217)	1.743*** (0.191)	1.280*** (0.205)	1.463*** (0.234)
Housing	0.896*** (0.284)	−0.361 (0.310)	2.221*** (0.306)	0.539** (0.272)	0.433 (0.290)	2.517*** (0.333)
Constant	0.306 (0.296)	1.828*** (0.327)	−2.454*** (0.330)	0.643** (0.282)	1.449*** (0.300)	−3.734*** (0.361)
Observations	4,839	4,795	4,872	5,380	5,325	5,268
Log Likelihood	−3,265.183	−2,950.264	−2,926.787	−3,584.626	−3,232.076	−2,599.466
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,540.367	5,910.528	5,863.575	7,179.252	6,474.151	5,208.933

Note:


*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure B.1: Incumbent party campaign strategies (marginal effects)



Notes: Figure B.1 displays the marginal effects calculated from columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table B.1.

Figure B.2: Opposition party campaign strategies (marginal effects)



Notes: Figure B.2 displays the marginal effects calculated from columns 4,5, and 6 of Table B.1.