

Syllabus PS-594: Governance, Accountability, and Corruption

Professor Sarah Brierley

Fall 2017

1 Introduction

- Welcome to PS-594! I look forward to meeting you. If you have questions now or throughout the course please email me at sabrierley@wustl.edu.
- I reserve the right to update any aspect of this syllabus. Last updated: [September 20, 2017](#).

2 Course description

The adoption of democracy is thought to encourage the establishment of public institutions that are responsive to the needs of citizens. Despite the introduction of electoral democracy across all regions, challenges of bad governance, high levels of corruption and low levels of accountability remain. This seminar provides an introduction to the comparative literature on three important outcomes: governance, corruption, and accountability. We will discuss how to conceptualize and measure these outcomes, and explore academic research that seeks to uncover the factors that influence them. While much of the literature we cover will discuss these challenges in the context of democracies in the Southern hemisphere, we will also explore important historical and theoretical work from the United States and Europe.

3 Logistics

- The class will meet Wednesdays from 4-6pm in 284 Seigle.
- You need to come to each session and participation will count towards your final grade.
- You will need to do the readings before coming to each session.
- Office Hours: I will hold office hours on Mondays from 3-5pm.

4 Course books

You will need to purchase two books for the course:

- David Gingerich. 2013. Political Institutions and Party Directed Corruption in South America. CUP.
- Anna Grzymala-Busse. 2007. Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies. CUP.

5 Grading

Your grades will be calculated according to the following breakdown:

- **Class participation and response memos (20%)**: All students are expected to have done the required readings and contribute to the class discussion. To facilitate discussion, each student is expected to write a short response memo based on the assigned readings. Guidelines on the memos are below. **You are not expected to submit a memo every week.** During the course of the semester you must each submit **four memos**.
 - The memo should be roughly 2 pages long. You can focus on one particular article/chapter or make connections across readings.
 - Your memo should summarize the argument and evidence of the work in question, but it should do something more: articulate alternative explanations, link to other work, and propose extensions. Questions to consider are: what is the authors' argument? Do the data support the argument or what additional data is needed? Is there alternative argument to the patterns displayed? What directions for future research arise from the paper? How would you go about conducting future research on this topic?
 - These response memos should be submitted in the class Box no later than Tuesday (at noon) before class. Please read other students papers before class.
- **Class discussant (20%)**: One student will be in charge of leading our discussion, and every seminar participant will have to perform as discussant 3-4 times in the semester. The discussants should prepare a list of discussion questions or main points and submit these no later than Tuesday (at noon) before class to the entire class. You should also be prepared to act as a “defender” for any of the papers. There is a natural tendency for graduate seminars to overfocus on shortcomings of written work without considering the bigger picture on what the authors have achieved.
- **Referee Report (20%)** In this report, you critically evaluate one of the selected “referee” readings for this course. Your referee report should begin with a one paragraph summary of the article. Include in this paragraph a sentence or two on the the contribution it makes to the literature. It should then identify 3-4 main shortcomings and how the author might address these. Throughout, write as if you are addressing the author directly, and give constructive and realistic feedback. Conclude with minor points. The total length should be 3-4 pages.
- **Research Paper or Project (40%)**: Lively discussions are great things, but the goal of the class is to move you further along the path to developing your own research agenda. To facilitate this, we will either work on a group project or you will work on an individual project throughout the semester. A final research proposal will look like an empirical journal article, only without the actual analysis. It will include a statement of a research question or puzzle, a review of the literature related to the topic, theoretical arguments that can be used to provide an answer to the question, hypotheses drawn from these theories that can be tested empirically, and a description of what empirical evidence and methods will be used to test these hypotheses (including how the hypotheses could be falsified). It can also contain some initial analysis of the data.

6 Reading and Topics

- Week 1: Governance and the machinery of the state
 - Fukuyama, Francis. “What is governance?.” *Governance* 26.3 (2013): 347-368.
 - Weber, Max. 1978. p.212-226. *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology.* University of California Press.
 - Skowronek, Stephen. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920.* Cambridge University Press, 1982. (Chapters 3 and 6)

Additional readings:

- Fukuyama, Francis. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, (Cornell University Press, 2004), Ch. 1
- Week 2: The state as a patronage resource
 - Grzymala-Busse, Anna. *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007) Ch. 2
 - O’Dwyer, Conor. “Runaway State-Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Postcommunist Europe” *World Politics* (2004) July, pp. 520-534.
 - Grindle, Merilee S. 2012. Chapter 4. *Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective*. Harvard University Press.
 - Oliveros, Virginia. “Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina.” *Comparative Politics*, 2016. **(Referee report paper)**

Additional readings:

- O’Dwyer, Conor. *Runaway State-Building* (Johns Hopkins University Press)
- Golden, Miriam. (2003) “Electoral connections: the effects of the personal vote on political patronage, bureaucracy, and legislation in postwar Italy.” *BJPS* 33(2): 189.
- Wilson, James Q. (1961) “The economy of patronage” *JPE* 69(4): 369.
- Shefter, Martin, (1977) “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy” *Politics and Society* pp. 403-424
- Week 3: Meritocracy reforms and bureaucratic isolation
 - Geddes, Barbara. 1994. *Politician’s dilemma: building state capacity in Latin America*. University of California Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
 - Grindle, Merilee S. 2012. Chapter 6. *Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective*. Harvard University Press.
 - David Lewis. 2008. p.11-30. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton University Press.
 - Theriault, Sean M. (2003) “Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the power of the people.” *JOP* 65(1): 50.

Skim through:

- Rauch, James E, and Peter B Evans. “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries.” *Journal of Public Economics* 75, no. 1 (January 2000): 4971.
- Dahlstrom Carl, Victor Lapuente and Jan Teorell. 2012. “The merit of meritocratization: politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption.” *Political Research Quarterly* 65(3):656-668. **(Referee report paper)**

Additional readings:

- Geddes, Barbara. (1991): *A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies*
- David Carpenter. 2001. p. 40-76. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy*. Princeton University Press.
- Grindle, Merilee S. 2012. Chapter 7. *Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective*. Harvard University Press.
- Ting, Michael M., James M. Snyder, Shigeo Hirano, and Olle Folke. 2013. “Elections and Reform: The Adoption of Civil Service in the U.S. States,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25 (3): 363-387.

- Week 4: Bureaucratic delegation and agency models
 - Huber, John and Shipan, Charles R. (2002) *Deliberate Discretion*. Cambridge University Press. Conclusion of Ch. 2., and Ch. 4.
 - * Corresponding book review. Michael Thies. *Journal of Politics*.
 - Gailmard, Sean. (2012). “Accountability and Principal-Agent Models. p 1-21. *Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability*.
 - Volden, Craig. 2002. “Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 18 (1): 187-220.

Additional readings:

- Huber, John and McCarty, Nolan. 2004. ”Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform” *American Political Science Review*
 - Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. “Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion”, *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 697-722.
 - Lowi, Theodore. (1987) “Two Roads to Serfdom.” *American University Law Review* 36: 295.
 - Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2014. “Giving Advice vs. Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation.
- Week 5: The structure of the bureaucracy and the political control of bureaucrats
 - Wade, Robert. 1982. “The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India.” *The Journal of Development Studies* 18(3):287-328.
 - Brierley, Sarah. 2017. “Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Local Governments in Ghana.” Working Paper.
 - Gulzar, Saad, and Benjamin J. Pasquale. “Politicians, bureaucrats, and development: Evidence from India.” *American Political Science Review* 111.1 (2017): 162-183.
 - Banerjee, A., R. Chattopadhyay, E. Duflo and D. Keniston (2012) “Can Institutions be Reformed from Within? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment with the Rajasthan Police.” NBER Working Paper No. 17912. 2-27. **(Referee report paper)**.

Additional readings:

- Hassan, Mai. 2016. “The Strategic Shuffle: Ethnic Geography, the Internal Security Apparatus, and Elections in Kenya.” *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2):382-395.
 - Abbink, Klaus. “Staff Rotation as an Anti-Corruption Policy: An Experimental Study.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 20, no. 4 (2004): 887-906.
 - Iyer, L. and A. Mani (2012). “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(3): 723-738.
- Week 6: Corruption: where is it and how can it be measured?
 - Svensson, Jakob. 2005. “Eight Questions about Corruption”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3): 194-211.
 - Treisman, Daniel. 2007. “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol 10, 211-241.
 - Rothstein, Bo and Eric Uslaner. 2005. “All for All: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust. *World Politics*, pp. 46-49, 63-72.
 - Olken, Benjamin and Rohini Pande. 2012. “Corruption in Developing Countries”, *Annual Review of Economics*, Vol. 4 pp. 479 - 509.

Additional readings:

- Treisman, Daniel. (2000). “The causes of corruption: a cross-national study.” *Journal of public economics*, 76(3), 399-407; 437-442.
- Lee, Wang-Sheng, and Cahit Guven. “Engaging in Corruption: The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Microlevel.” *Journal of Economic Psychology* 39 (December 2013): 287300. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.006.

- Week 7: Grand corruption and campaign finance

- Bussell, Jennifer. 2013. Chapter 2 and 7. *Corruption and Reform in India: Public Services in the Digital Age*. Cambridge University Press.
- Economist, “Campaign finance in India: Black money power”, May 2014.
- Gingerich, Daniel W. 2013. Chapter 1 and 4. *Political institutions and party-directed corruption in South America: Stealing for the team*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mironov, Maxim and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2015. “Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data.”

Additional readings:

- Kwaja, Asim Ijaz and Atif Mian, “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November 2005.

- Week 8: RESEARCH PROJECT

- Week 9: Interventions (E-governance and transparency)

- Transparency
 - * Kosack, Stephen and Archon Fung. “Does Transparency Improve Governance?” *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2014.
 - * Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto. “Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2016.
- E-governance
 - * Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar. “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India.” *American Economic Review*, 2016. (**Referee report paper**)
 - * Lewis-Faupel, Sean, Yusuf Negeri, Benjamin A. Olken, and Rohini Pande. “Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia.” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2016. (**Referee report paper**)

Additional readings:

- * Bussell, Jennifer L. “Why Get Technical? Corruption and the Politics of Public Service Reform in the Indian States.” *Comparative Political Studies*, May 11, 2010.
- * Reinikka, Ritva, and Jakob Svensson. “Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3, no. 23 (2005): 259267.

- Week 10: Interventions (Wages, Audits, and Anti-Corruption Institutions)

- Audits
 - * Di Tella, Rafael, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. “The Role of Wages and Auditing During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 46, no. 1 (2003): 26992.

- * Olken, Benjamin A. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” *Journal of Political Economy* 115, no. 2 (2007): 200249. (**Referee report paper**)
- Wages
 - * Dal B, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martn A. Rossi. “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128, no. 3 (August 1, 2013): 11691218.
- Anti-Corruption Agencies
 - * Asibuo, Sam K. “The Role of Anti-Corruption Agency in the Struggle Against Corruption: The Case of the Serious Office in Ghana.” *African Administrative Studies* 56 (2001): 114.
- Additional readings:
 - * Bobonis, Gustavo J., Luis R. Cmara Fuentes, and Rainer Schwabe. “Monitoring Corruptible Politicians.” *American Economic Review*, n.d.
 - * Quah, Jon S. T. “Anti-Corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries: A Comparative Analysis.” *International Public Management Review* 8, no. 2 (2007): 7396.
- Week 11: RESEARCH PROJECT
- Week 12: Theories of accountability
 - Manin, Bernard, Przeworski, Adam and Stokes, Susan C. Elections and representation. Ch. 1 in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge University Press (1999)
 - Besley, Timothy. 2005. “Political selection.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3):4360.
 - Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Incumbent performance and electoral control.” *Public Choice* 50(1):525.
 - Fearon, James D. 1999. Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 5597.
- Week 13: **Thanksgiving Break**
- Week 14: Electoral accountability in practice
 - Ashworth, Scott. 2012. “Electoral accountability: recent theoretical and empirical work.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15:183201.
 - Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments.” *The American Economic Review* 101, no. 4 (2011): 12741311.
 - Ofosu, George. “Do Fair Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?” Working paper.
 - Fujiwara, Thomas. 2013. “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil
- Week 15: Decentralization and accountability
 - Bardhan, Pranab. “Decentralization of governance and development.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16.4 (2002): 185-205.
 - Reinikka, Ritva, and Jakob Svensson. “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, no. 2 (2004): 679-705.
 - Baldwin, Kate. “Why vote with the chief? Political connections and public goods provision in Zambia.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4 (2013): 794-809. (**Referee report paper**)

7 Academic Integrity

WUSTL is a community of scholars. In this community, all members including faculty, staff and students alike are responsible for maintaining standards of academic honesty. As a student and member of the University community, you are here to get an education and are, therefore, expected to demonstrate integrity in your academic endeavors. You are evaluated on your own merits. Cheating, plagiarism, collaborative work, multiple submissions without the permission of the instructor, or other kinds of academic dishonesty are considered unacceptable behavior and will result in formal disciplinary proceedings usually resulting in suspension or dismissal.

As specified in the Academic Integrity Policy, violations or attempted violations of academic dishonesty include, but are not limited to, cheating, fabrication, plagiarism, multiple submissions or facilitating academic dishonesty.

8 Campus Resources

If you have any concerns about:

- **Academic Writing:** The Writing Center is a free service for all students, both graduate and undergraduate, currently enrolled at Washington University in St. Louis. They provide free one-on-one writing tutorials to all Wash U students. They also offer a variety of writing workshops designed to help you become a better writer. You can schedule an appointment here: <https://writingcenter.wustl.edu/writing/schedule-an-appointment/>
- **Disability resources** If you have a disability that requires an accommodation, please speak with instructor and consult the Disability Resource Center at Cornerstone (<http://cornerstone.wustl.edu/>). Cornerstone staff will determine appropriate accommodations and will work with your instructor to make sure these are available to you.
- **Mental health:** Life at university can be stressful. Remember that you are never alone. You can speak to a therapist or counselor through the Mental Health Services (MHS) at Washington University. MHS is committed to providing a safe, inclusive and affirming community of care for all students. You can find out about making a confidential appointment here: <https://shs.wustl.edu/MentalHealth/Pages/Making-an-Appointment.aspx>.
- **Bias reporting:** A bias incident is any discriminatory or hurtful act that appears to be or is perceived by the victim to be motivated by race, ethnicity, age, religion, national origin, sex, disability, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, veteran status or socioeconomic status. To be considered an incident, the act is not required to be a crime under any federal, state or local statutes, nor does it have to violate university policy. The University has a process through which students, faculty, staff and community members who have experienced or witnessed incidents of bias, prejudice or discrimination against a student can report their experiences to the University's Bias Report and Support System (BRSS) team. See: <https://brss.wustl.edu> for more details.
- **Sexual Assault** The University is committed to offering reasonable academic accommodations to students who are victims of sexual assault. Students are eligible for accommodation regardless of whether they seek criminal or disciplinary action. Depending on the specific nature of the allegation, such measures may include but are not limited to: implementation of a no-contact order, course/classroom assignment changes, and other academic support services and accommodations. If you need to request such accommodations, please direct your request to Kim Webb (kim.webb@wustl.edu), Director of the Relationship and Sexual Violence Prevention Center. Ms. Webb is a confidential resource; however, requests for accommodations will be shared with the appropriate University administration and faculty. The University will maintain as confidential any accommodations or protective measures provided to an individual student so long as it does not impair the ability to provide such measures.
- **Sexual Assault Reporting** If a student comes to me to discuss or disclose an instance of sexual assault, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, dating violence, domestic violence or stalking, or if I

otherwise observe or become aware of such an allegation, I will keep the information as private as I can, but as a faculty member of Washington University, I am required to immediately report it to my Department Chair or Dean or directly to Ms. Jessica Kennedy, the University's Title IX Coordinator. If you would like to speak with the Title IX Coordinator directly, Ms. Kennedy can be reached at (314) 935-3118, jwkennedy@wustl.edu, or by visiting her office in the Women's Building. Additionally, you can report incidents or complaints to Tamara King, Associate Dean for Students and Director of Student Conduct, or by contacting WUPD at (314) 935-5555 or your local law enforcement agency. You can also speak confidentially and learn more about available resources at the Relationship and Sexual Violence Prevention Center by calling (314) 935-8761 or visiting the 4th floor of Seigle Hall.